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The prevailing consensus on the role of central banks has eroded. The 
pursuit of the goal of price stability only is now insufficient to ensure macroe-
conomic and financial stability. A new paradigm emerges in which central 
banks should ensure price stability, growth and financial stability. Recent insti-
tutional developments of the ECB go in this direction since it will be in charge 
of the micro-prudential supervision. In addition, the conduct of monetary 
policy in the euro area shows that the ECB also remained attentive to the evolu-
tion of economic growth. But if the ECB implements its triple mandate, the 
question of the proper relationship between these missions still arises. Coordi-
nation between the different actors in charge of monetary policy, financial 
regulation and fiscal policy is paramount and is lacking in the current architec-
ture. Besides, certain practices should be clarified. The ECB has played a role as 
lender of last resort (towards banks and, to a lesser extent, towards governe-
ments) although this mission was not allocated to the ECB. Finally, in this new 
framework, the ECB suffers from a democratic illegitimacy, reinforced by the 
increasing role it plays in determining the macroeconomic and financial 
balance of the euro area. It seems important that the ECB is more explicit with 
regard to its different objectives and that it fulfils the conditions for close coop-
eration with the budgetary authorities and financial regulators. Finally, we call 
for the ex nihilo creation of a supervisory body of the ECB, which responsibility 
would be to discuss and analyze the relevance of the ECB monetary policy.
The financial crisis which began in 2007 initiated a debate on 
the role of central banks and monetary policy before, during and 
after the economic crisis. In particular, the consensus that had 
prevailed since the 1980s has cracked. It was based on four main 
features:
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— Price stability is the primary objective (if not only) of central 
banks; 
— Short-term monetary policy has real effects on growth; 
— The financial stability can be borne by the central bank or 
delegated to another authority, but it remains that, 
according to the Tinbergen principle, these two objectives 
have to be achieved through the use of two independent 
instruments. The objective of price stability is achieved 
through changes in the central bank interest rate while 
financial stability is based on the control of credit institu-
tions via a micro-prudential policy; 
— Price stability leads to financial stability and to macroeco-
nomic stability (around the potential of the economy).
This consensus is now being challenged. The crisis has shown 
that price stability was not sufficient to ensure financial stability1
and could even be a vector of financial imbalances.2 Hence one has 
questioned the role of central banks.3 Should they be concerned 
about financial stability and if so, what is the best instrument to 
achieve it? Several options can be considered. Central banks can 
integrate the objective of financial stability in the conduct of 
monetary policy (the so-called “leaning against the wind” policy). 
In addition to the micro-prudential regulation, central banks may 
implement macro-prudential policy. This differs from a micro-
prudential approach in that it identifies and limits the sources of 
systemic risk.
Moreover, this question must take account of the macro-finan-
cial environment marked by high unemployment in the euro area 
and the increase in public debt. Monetary policy decisions have an 
impact on inflation but also on growth, employment, the 
dynamics of public and private debt and the level of risk in the 
financial system. This article aims at shedding light on these issues 
from a European perspective. If price stability remains the primary 
objective of the ECB, the Maastricht Treaty does not preclude other 
objectives, including growth and employment. Moreover, the 
1. Already claimed by Borio & Lowe (2002) and White (2006).
2. Macroeconomic stability makes it possible for central banks to keep interest rate at a 
moderate and stable level, which leads the financial system to increase its level of leverage and 
vulnerability.
3. See Betbèze et al. (2011).
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implementation of a banking union explicitly devotes a new 
prerogative for the ECB: namely, financial stability. The ECB is 
thus now responsible for banking supervision (micro-prudential 
instrument). The link between the ECB, pursuing different objec-
tives, and other institutions (national governments implementing 
fiscal policy and the European Systemic Risk Board managing 
systematic risk) must be clarified and we show that this link is still 
raising questions.
1. The ECB’s de facto triple mandate
The ECB is de facto dealing with three mandates: price stability, 
growth (employment) and financial stability:
— Price stability has been enshrined in the Treaty (Article 127) 
as the main objective for monetary policy;
— The growth objective is relegated to second rank. The Treaty 
actually states that “without prejudice to the primary objec-
tive of price stability, the ESCB [European System of Central 
Banks] shall support the general policies in the Union”;
— The implementation of a banking union grants the ECB a 
role in financial regulation (Council Decision of the Euro-
pean Union of 15 October 2013). ECB will be in charge of 
banking supervision, micro-prudential policy, as part of a 
SSM (Single supervisory mechanism). Under the new system 
of supervision, the ECB will directly supervise “significant” 
credit institutions. It will assume these new responsabilities 
in Autumn 2014 and will work in close cooperation with 
national competent authorities.
Even if the treaty establishes a clear hierarchy among objectives, 
in practice, the ECB has been concerned with both changes in 
inflation and growth.4 An explicit dual mandate would probably 
be more appropriate. In the US case, Rosengren (2013) considers 
indeed that the dual mandate helps the Federal Reserve to better 
account for expansionary monetary policy in times of crisis, where 
unemployment is very high. In EMU putting equal weights on 
inflation and growth objectives would imply a revision of the 
4. Castro (2011) has recently estimated Taylor rules over 1999:1 et 2007:12 and has found that 
the ECB has significantly reacted to inflation and output gap.
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Treaty, which is a long procedure requiring unanimity of EMU 
members. Pragmatic views may then be privileged. Since the defi-
nition of price stability or optimal level of inflation is not clearly 
established,5 the ECB has already sufficient leeway to articulate its 
action appropriately according to the objectives of employment 
and inflation.
Moreover, the decisions of the ECB during the crisis have illus-
trated pragmatism from the ECB. It has notably met the liquidity 
needs of European banks, changing the operational framework 
when it was deemed necessary. The ECB has played a role as lender 
of last resort for banks, although this task is not included in its 
mandate. Larger defaults resulting from the liquidity crisis could 
then be avoided. The ECB created a very long term refinancing 
operation (VLTRO) by which it provided funds to credit institu-
tions for a 3 years period. It was not only important to cover 
liquidity needs but also allowed banks to support sovereign debt 
market. Under the SMP (Securities Market Program), the ECB 
proceeded to purchases of public securities in the secondary 
market. This program and the OMT6 announcement (Outright 
Monetary Transactions), that has followed in September 2012, 
have illustrated the will of the ECB to tackle the sovereign debt 
crisis. It has shown that the ECB was able to avoid a narrow inter-
pretation of its mandate and missions.7 This was notably justified 
by the need to restore the transmission channels of monetary 
policy, that had been impaired by the financial turmoils on sover-
eign debt markets (Cour-Thiman and Winkler, 2013). More 
recently, Mr. Draghi has adopted a forward guidance strategy, in 
which the central bank announces that it maintains its main 
interest rate at a level close to zero for an extended period. The aim 
is to drive expectations of interest rates, and thus enhance the 
transmission of monetary policy. This new communication breaks 
with past speeches ECB in which the ECB did not commit on 
future interest rate decisions.
5. See Billi & Kahn (2008), for example.
6. The ECB may buy unlimited amounts of sovereign bonds issued by countries which are 
under EFSF – ESM programs.
7. It should nevertheless be remind that these decisions have generated considerable debate, 
including the Board of Governors. J. Weidman, president of the Bundesbank, had notably made 
clear his opposition to the outright purchases of government securities.
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In summary, although the mandate of the ECB is restrictive, its 
action reflects broader concerns. The ECB has focused on both 
inflation and growth. It has contributed to financial stability, as 
should do a lender of last resort. In addition, recent regulatory 
decisions will increase its powers giving the ECB the micro-pruden-
tial supervision of the banking system. The ECB therefore pursues 
three objectives.
2. A Work in progress
If the triple mandate proves to be right, the question of the 
proper relationship between these missions still arises. The tradeoff 
between inflation and growth is already duly integrated into the 
action of the ECB. Press releases routinely evoke the balance of 
risks between inflation and growth. In the current context of a 
deflation risk, the ECB could build on its forward-guidance strategy 
to make explicit a target for unemployment. This choice, made by 
the Bank of England (BoE) would clarify the communication 
strategy of the ECB since the stance of monetary policy would 
become contingent to a threshold on a direct observable variable 
(Bank of England, 2013). The action taken by the BoE indicates 
that such a decision is not inconsistent with an inflation target or a 
mandate focused on price stability.
Another tradeoff arises regarding the relationship between 
monetary policy and micro-prudential policy. It is common for 
central banks to be jointly responsible for the conduct of monetary 
policy and for banking supervision (Netherlands, Spain, United 
States in particular). Central banks have some expertise of banking 
monitoring since they collect information for their monetary policy 
operations. Given the link between the two objectives, a single 
institution in charge of these two objectives appears more effective 
to internalize interdependencies. Finally, to the extent that the ECB 
is the lender of last resort for banks, it is desirable that it has the 
necessary information and powers to meet liquidity needs.
Moreover, if the SSM provides the ECB with prerogatives in 
terms of micro-prudential policy, the implementation of macro-
prudential policy amounts to a new institution: the ESRB (Euro-
pean Systemic Risk Board). This new tool is essential insofar as the 
supervision of financial institutions at the individual level is insuf-
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ficient to manage the risks taken by the financial system as a 
whole. However, the ESRB is only a proposal body. The macro-
prudential policy implementation, through restrictions on the 
loan-to-value ratio, is ultimately up to the Member States which 
shall notify and coordinate their decisions with the ECB. Because 
there is a strong complementarity between monetary policy and 
macro-prudential policy, it would have been more appropriate for 
this task to be handled by the ECB, especially as some regulatory 
tools, such as capital requirements, can be seen as part of both 
macro- and micro-prudential policies. Moreover, it is likely that 
with the macro-prudential tool, the ECB would have been able to 
reduce the asymmetries resulting from the implementation of a 
common monetary policy in a structurally heterogeneous area. 
Between 2001 and 2007, the ECB interest rate was probably too 
high for Germany and too low for Spain. The housing bubble in 
Spain (or Ireland) could have been avoided if appropriate restric-
tions on credit growth and loan-to-value ratios had been 
implemented. Similarly, the monetary authorities could have 
sounded the alarm about the hypertrophy of Irish or Cypriot 
banking systems.
Furthermore, the ECB will have to be transparent on the link it 
intends to do between its monetary policy and financial stability 
actions. The principle of strict separation of instruments is ques-
tioned in favour of a so-called integrated policy-mix in which the 
central bank may decide to use its conventional instrument (the 
interest rate) for financial risk considerations. To this end, the ECB 
might amend its second pillar about monitoring a monetary aggre-
gate to assess risks to medium-term price stability. Its monetarist 
bias is no longer relevant given the downward trend in money 
velocity, and could be transformed to reflect a set of signals (credit 
growth, level of financial system leverage, debt of non-financial 
agents, real estate prices, etc.) about financial and monetary risks.
The question of the lender and buyer of last resort should be 
clarified. The ECB has played this role for banks while it was not 
specifically in charge of this mission. The question is even more 
acute for the sovereign debt market to the extent that governments 
are subject to liquidity risks (Buiter and Rahbari, 2012 or De 
Grauwe, 2011). Since illiquidity causes problems of macroeco-
nomic, financial and social instability, it becomes justified to 
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guard against this risk through central bank intervention. The 
panic on sovereign debt markets has been a major threat for the 
euro area. De Grauwe (2012) points out that the fragility of the 
members of a monetary union is increased because its entities are 
in fact indebted in a currency they have no control over. The SMP 
implementation and the OMT announcement in the euro area or 
the BoE and Fed interventions have shown that this type of meas-
ures is essential for the effectiveness of monetary policy and to 
mitigate risks of financial instability. While the ECB has acted 
pragmatically, it remains that the doctrine on this issue must be 
stated. In the absence of further fiscal integration, the formaliza-
tion of the role of lender and buyer of last resort attributed to the 
ECB, for both banks and governments, should be considered. 
Finally, it is crucial that future ECB monetary policies are not 
conditioned by the attitude or psychology of the central banker in 
charge, sometimes pragmatic, sometimes dogmatic, as uncertainty 
harms central bank credibility and the anchoring of expectations.8
De facto, central banks own and manage a large amount of 
public debt (Blommestein and Turner, 2012), a task that they 
already fulfilled in the past (Goodhart, 2010). The implementation 
of unconventional monetary policy reinforces the interactions 
between monetary and fiscal policies and raises the problematic of 
their coordination. But, nowadays, none of European institutions 
are in capacity to built such coordination. Decentralised fiscal poli-
cies increase the challenge to create it. Nevertheless this is crucial. 
Moreover, we have to raise the question of ECB’s independence 
and its democratic accountability. The current architecture gives 
the ECB a very strong independence both in terms of means and 
objectives. An enlargement of ECB’s missions to the financial 
sphere gives to the central bank an essential role in the determina-
tion of Eurozone’s macroeconomic and financial equilibrium. The 
question of its democratic legitimacy (a debate already evoked by 
J. Stiglitz in 1998) becomes even more accurate. On this subject, 
8. This personalization of monetary policy passes on to Bernanke et al. (2001) that despite a 
sort of de facto inflation targeting by the Federal Reserve, in particular under the mandate of A. 
Greenspan, it was important to establish a de jure inflation targeting: whatever the personality 
and charisma of the U.S. central banker, the implementation of her/his action in a clearly 
defined institutional framework would promote the credibility of the commitment to achieve 
the Fed’s dual mandate.
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three postures are supported. The first claims that with more 
responsibilities, central banks are even more subject to political 
pressures and they need additional protections to guarantee their 
action. This is the idea defended by the CIEPR (2011). In this case, 
ECB’s independence has to be maintained and may be reinforced. 
At the opposite of this position, one can imagine that ECB’s 
mandates along with the current macroeconomic and financial 
context plead for a re-examination of central banks’ independence 
in order to insure a better democratic control. We can recall that 
independence is nor a historical constant (e.g. Forder, 1998), 
neither necessary to insure stability (e.g. Hayo, 1998). Finally, in 
the European perspective, a third way could be to protect ECB’s 
independence in terms of means but to modify its independence in 
terms of objectives. Objectives of price stability, employment and 
financial stability could be decided regularly, coordinated and 
democratically controlled. In the US, this control is exerted by the 
congress. At the European level, the situation is more complex 
because the European Parliament gathered not only eurodeputies 
from Eurozone’s countries. This institution has thus to be invented.   
3. A subsidiary question: the exchange rate policy
ECB’s actions in order to facilitate the recovery and to correct 
the imbalances could use exchange rate policy. The Maastricht 
Treaty gives to the European Council the power to formulate 
general orientations for exchange rate policy. But before that, a 
consensus has to be reached in the Eurogroup that requires 
homogenous preferences. And after, the ECB will accept these 
recommendations only if it doesn’t undermine its primary objec-
tive. These institutional arrangements lead in fine to a capture 
(Cartapanis, 2006) or a “quiet hold-up” of the exchange rate policy 
by the ECB (Creel et al., 2007). This issue is essential since there is 
currently an international currency war at the expense of the euro. 
A euro depreciation could be an efficient remedy to help stimulate 
growth, via more exports, and to alleviate deflation risks. More-
over, a decrease of the euro could have asymmetric rebalancing 
effects. Blot & Cochard (2008) estimate export price elasticity and 
suggest that a decrease of the European single currency could be 
first in favour of the Spanish exports and then help the French 
ones and lastly the German.9 An active exchange rate policy could 
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then be effective in reducing the heterogeneities into the Eurozone 
without envisaging a termination of the monetary union or 
competitive devaluations in each member states that only exacer-
bate deflation. In the short run, a consensus between governments 
is a chimera. Nevertheless, it is now recognized that the ECB’s 
monetary policy is too restrictive given the macroeconomic 
context (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2014). A more expansionist mone-
tary policy could allow a depreciation of the euro. 
4. Conclusion and policy recommendations
We have emphasized that the ECB has actually followed three 
objectives. However, the articulation between these objectives 
needs clarification. To this end, we provide the following 
recommendations:
1. Without modification of existing treaties, it is important for 
the ECB to be more explicit on the different objectives. The 
priority given to the objective of price stability does not 
seem now to match the practice of monetary policy. The 
growth objective is essential, as well as financial stability. 
More transparency would make monetary policy more cred-
ible and more effective. It would help to prevent from future 
financial and banking crisis. Exchange rate policy should not 
be overlooked because it can redound to the reduction of 
macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area.
2. In the absence of such clarification, extensive independence 
of the ECB should be challenged to better match the interna-
tional standards in this area. Central banks have rarely 
independence objective: for example, the Federal Reserve 
pursues an explicit dual mandate, while inflation targeting is 
institutionalized for the BoE. An explicit triple mandate 
could be imposed on the ECB, in charge of the governing 
Council to deal with the tradeoff between these objectives.
3. Yet, the difficulty to handle this tradeoff increases with the 
number of objectives. This difficulty is amplified in the 
current context of high public debt and where central banks 
9. More recently, Héricourt et al. (2014) find however that the differences between the French 
and the German price elasticity are very small.
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are actually dealing with management of public debt. The 
mandate of the ECB should explicitly mention the role of 
lender of last resort, the usual task of central banks, which 
would clarify the need for a closer coordination between 
governments and the ECB. 
4. Rather than questioning the total independence of the ECB, 
which never get unanimity among the Member States, we 
call for the set up ex nihilo of a supervisory body of the ECB, 
responsible for discussing and analyzing the relevance of the 
conduct of monetary policy under the broader objectives of 
the ECB: price stability, growth, financial stability and 
sustainability of public finances.
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